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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1991, four hundred fifty garment workers employed by
Raymond and Yee Nor Kong found the doors to their workplace padlocked.
These workers had no prior notice that the nine shops owned by the Kongs
were about to go out of business. 1 For the workers, the closure of the shops
meant more than the suspension of future income. The Kongs had not paid
them for two months, claiming that money was tight and that compensation
would follow when cash became available. The Kongs had borrowed substan-
tial sums from their employees, threatening to terminate workers who would
not lend them money. Furthermore, the Kongs had ceased paying health
insurance premiums, despite having deducted money from employees' pay-
checks for this purpose. Employees and their families were left without health
coverage although they had paid for insurance.2 The California Labor
Commissioner's Office described this case as one of the worst single violations
of wage and hour laws it had ever confronted.3
The Kong case is just one example of a widespread pattern of labor rights
abuses in the garment industry,4 a global industry with significant production
facilities within the United States that predominantly employs poor women of
color.' United States industry is not immune to charges of labor rights abuses,
as the Kong case demonstrates. Although international labor lawyers rarely
look to the United States first when examining worker rights violations in a
global industry, the U.S. garment industry warrants such attention.
The U.S. garment industry has violated both international labor standards
and federal and state labor laws with some degree of impunity for decades.
Manufacturers allow their clothing to be produced by contractors who under-
t The author was formerly an attorney with the Asian Law Caucus and is currently the National
Director of the Japanese American Citizens League in San Francisco.
1. Robert Collier, Sewing for a Living: Unregulated Exploitation, S.F. WKLY., July 24, 1991, at 1.
2. Steven A. Chin, Garment Firm's Owners Sought, S.F. EXAMINER, July 22, 1991, at 1.
3. Interview with Henry Huerta, Deputy Labor Commissioner, Office of the Labor Commissioner
of San Francisco, in San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 1, 1991).
4. Whether toiling in Taiwan, the Philippines, Central America, El Paso, or Chinatown, garment
workers are paid wages at or below subsistence level. In Guatemala, for example, about fifty thousand
Guatemalans sew for name-brand manufacturers such as Levi Strauss, Van Heusen, Calvin Klein, and Liz
Claiborne, earning less than seven dollars per day. Mary Jo McConahay, Koret Move Reflects an Industry
Trend, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 1990, at A4.
5. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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pay and mistreat workers, undeterred by an international regime that has little
enforcement power or by a domestic statutory scheme that has failed to curb
labor rights abuses in the industry. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA),6 designed to protect workers from wage and hour violations, does
not hold the manufacturers who contract out sewing work liable for such
abuses. FLSA has done little to curb labor rights abuses in the U.S. garment
industry in its present state. Under FLSA, ill-treated workers have been able
to sue only intermediary contractors who, for lack of resources, are often
effectively judgment-proof. To remedy this serious and growing problem,
Congress must amend FLSA to create a cause of action against name-brand
manufacturers whose garments are produced by contractors under conditions
that violate the provisions of FLSA.
Before developing several policy arguments to support such an amendment,
this paper provides an overview of the industry and the position of U.S.
workers and manufacturers within it. Part II describes the effect of internation-
al competition on labor practices within the United States. Part m! discusses
the structure of the garment industry and the relationship between manufactur-
ers, contractors, and workers. Part IV describes manufacturer complicity in
labor rights abuses. Part V presents the proposed amendment to FLSA and
provides the policy arguments supporting such a remedy. Finally, part VI
assesses the objections and practical difficulties such an amendment is likely
to encounter.
I. EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION ON U.S. LABOR PRACTICES
Garment production in the United States is part of a worldwide industry
that has changed markedly over the last thirty years.7 In the late 1950s, only
one out of twenty-five garments purchased in the United States was produced
abroad.8 During the 1960s and 1970s, domestic manufacturers began moving
operations to Asia and South America in search of cheaper labor.9 By the late
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
7. Dilip K. Das, Dismantling the Multifibre Arrangement?, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 67, 68 (1985).
8. Diane Yen-Mei Wong, Behind UnmarkedDoors: Developments in the Garment Industry, in MAKINO
WAVES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN 159, 166 (Asian
Women Unitedof Cal. ed., 1989); Carol A. Parsons, TheDomestic Employment Consequences of Managed
International Competition inApparel, in THE DYNAMICS OF TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT 113, 113-20 (Laura
D'Andrea Tyson et al. eds., 1988).
9. In 1982, foreign competitors could hire labor at wages ranging from 5 to 32% of U.S. wage levels.
Parsons, supra note 8, at 137-38. An associate research director for the International Ladies Garment
Workers' Union estimated that the average garment worker earns $0.25 per hour in the Philippines, $0.16
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1980s, sixty to sixty-five percent of U.S. name-brand garments were produced
overseas.
10
However, in recent years a combination of uncertain political conditions
abroad, increased labor costs, poor workmanship, and problems associated
with moving goods quickly from distant locations has worked to reverse this
trend.11 As one manufacturer stated, "[r]ight now, Korea, Hong Kong and
Taiwan are very expensive ... for labor, for quotas, for import duties.
Manufacturers that used to take up three,'fourfloors of a factory in Hong
Kong are now shrinking, shrinking, shrinking to one floor or half a floor. 2
As a result, the U.S. garment industry, though still sensitive to the problem
of "runaway shops,"1 3 remains a significant producer in the global assembly
line and a significant domestic employer.14 Indeed, statistics indicate that the
number of garment shops and garment workers in the United States has
increased substantially in the past ten years.' 5
Yet as illustrated by the Kong case, this spectacular growth has a dark side.
As one commentator argued, "Other than unabashedly illegal enterprises, [the
garment industry] is by all accounts the most lawless industry."16 Faced with
significant international competition, the industry has created, according to
sociologist Edna Bonacich, "a Third World labor force here to match the Third
World labor force with which they're competing abroad."' 7
Ample evidence supports Bonacich's claim. For example, in 1990 inspec-
tors from California's Department of Industrial Relations visited almost 1,700
garment shops in Los Angeles and cited eighty-six percent of the shops for
various labor law violations. They imposed $1.7 million in fines as a result
10. Wong, supra note 8, at 166.
11. Stephanie Strom, U.S. Garment Makers Come Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at D1.
12. Id.
13. The term "runaway shops" refers to manufacturers who move their garment production overseas
to circumvent burdensome government regulations and laws and to take advantage of cheaper labor costs.
14. Garment manufacturing in the United States employs over two million workers nationwide. OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE U.S. TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRY: A
REVOLUTION IN PROGRESS-SPECIAL REPORT 33 (1987) [hereinafter U.S. TEXTriLE SPECIAL REPORT].
California alone accounted for approximately 135,000 garment workers in 1990-1991, with approximately
95,000 workers in Los Angeles County and about 14,000 in the San Francisco Bay area. EMPLOYMENT
DEV. DEP'T, STATE OF CAL., GARMENT AND HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY SURVEY Attachment 1 (1991) (on
file with author) [hereinafter GARMENT INDUSTRY SURVEY]. Some estimate that the industry in Los Angeles
stimulates five billion dollars of economic activity a year in the local economy. Mark Thompson, Thread-
bare Justice, CAL. LAW., May 1990, at 30. In the San Francisco Bay area, the garment industry is the
largest manufacturing industry, accounting for23,000 jobs and five hundred million dollars in local volume.
Collier, supra note 1, at 12.
15. For example, the number of garment shops in California has increased from 2,750 in 1983 to
5,243 in 1990. Kelly (ust & Carolyn Newbergh, Threadbare Dreams: Abusei Abound in Oakland's
Sweatshops, OAKLAND TrE., July 28, 1991, at As.
16. Thompson, supra note 14, at 30.
17. Sonni Efron, Sweatshops Expanding Into Orange County, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1989, at A38;
Parsons, supra note 8, at 147.
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of this inspection.18 In San Francisco, a recent survey conducted by two
employees of a Garment Workers Center affiliated with the International
Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) discovered a similarly high percent-
age of violations. The Center's employees, who posed as seamstresses seeking
employment, applied for work at 230 shops, routinely inquiring about matters
such as payment of minimum wage, overtime, workers' compensation, and
other legally protected matters. They found that 161 shops, or seventy percent
of the shops surveyed, flatly refused to pay overtime, while sixty percent paid
below the minimum wage. Other shops employed young teenagers in violation
of child labor laws and regularly sent workers home at night with work to
avoid paying overtime. 9 Indeed, after telling a prospective employer that she
did not have much experience, one of the Center's surveyors was offered
training for no wages. "The boss offered to let me work for free. She said,
'I give you free thread, free electricity.' But I had to promise to stay for six
months. 2o
As these examples indicate, international competition has prompted some
U.S. garment makers to circumvent labor laws to reduce costs while maintain-
ing proximity to major markets. 2 ' Recent indications that more garment shops
are opening in the United States, though promising for U.S. workers, cannot
negate the effects of international trade on labor practices within the United
States.
ImI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. GARMENT INDUSTRY
A. Manufacturers and Contractors
Even without international competition, the very structure of the garment
industry renders abuses of labor laws virtually inevitable. A congressional
report describes the garment industry as the one sector of the textile industry
likely to retain a highly decentralized structure of small firms.' As a recently
published report noted, "There are over 15,000 firms in the industry, and the
top four firms in almost all product segments account for less than twenty-five
percent of total shipments."' This decentralization makes regulation difficult
and thwarts attempts to set standard wage rates.24
18. Thompson, supra note 14, at 30.
19. Collier, supra note 1, at 12.
20. Gust & Newbergh, supra note 15, at A8.
21. Parsons, supra note 8, at 146.
22. U.S. TEx-HLE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 33. While in many industries the fifty largest
firms account for 90 to 100% of domestic production, the fifty largest firms in women's apparel seldom
account for more than half of domestic shipments. Id. at 63.
23. Parsons, supra note 8, at 115.
24. Randi Weingarten, The Re-emergence of the Sweatshop in the Downstate New York Area, 15
INDUS. & LAB. REL. F. 69, 86 (1981).
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In addition, intense competition within the industry forces firms to cut
prices and reduce profit margins to perhaps the lowest of any U.S. industry.'
The multilayered structure of the industry means that many people are trying
to take a profit from this narrow margin. As one newspaper described:
Imagine four people with a powerful thirst who want to squeeze juice from an
orange. Imagine they're greedy.
They take turns squeezing it, so that the last person probably ends up with just
a few drops.
That's how the apparel industry is said to work-on the squeeze principle.
It starts with investors, financial houses and retailers who squeeze out big
profits, and ends with seamstresses who put in most of the labor for the few
remaining bucks left.'
The key players in the production aspect of the industry are manufacturers,
contractors, and garment workers. Manufacturers design and merchandise
apparel, but most now contract out the production of their garments.27 Con-
tracting out the production part of their business has enabled manufacturers
to minimize their investment and insulate themselves from instability and risk.
By characterizing their relationship with contractors as independent, they have
avoided legal responsibility for workers' compensation, unemployment insur-
ance and fringe benefits. In short, garment manufacturers have preferred
contracting for two reasons: they can control how much or how little contrac-
tors are paid, and they can take advantage of the prevailing presumption that
they are not liable for wage violations in their contractors' sweatshops.
Why are contractors so vulnerable to manufacturer domination? Sometimes
called "glorified workers,"28 contractors produce apparel according to specifi-
cations established by manufacturers. A contractor may work for one or
several manufacturers and obtains work by bidding against other contractors.
Bidding in the industry is fiercely competitive due to an overabundance of
contractors.29
Most contractors in the major garment centers are monolingual immigrants
who were formerly garment workers themselves. They open or buy garment
shops because entering the industry is one of the few opportunities for econom-
25. Id. at 83-84; U.S. TEXTILE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 64.
26. Carolyn Newbergh & Kelly Gust, Seamstresses Crushed Under Profit Squeeze Pile, OAKLAND
TRm., July 28, 1991, at A9.
27. The trend for apparel firms to abandon producing their own garments in favor of contracting the
work out became evident in women's outerwear between 1977 and 1982. U.S. TEXTILE SPEcIAL REPORT,
supra note 14, at 62. A prime illustration of this strategy is provided by Liz Claiborne, the world's largest
women's apparel company, which does not produce any of its own merchandise. Liz Claiborne uses over
70 contractors, approximately 32% of whom produce the garments in the United States. Parsons, supra
note 8, at 145.
28. Merle Linda Wolin, Sweatshop: Underneath in the Garment Industry (pt. 5), L.A. HERALD
EXAMINER, Jan. 28, 1981, at AS. Another author described a contractor as 'more of a supervisor of
employees than an employer himself.' Weingarten, supra note 24, at 85.
29. Newbergh & Gust, supra note 26, at A9.
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ic advancement available to them that requires little capital." Having gone
into business with the smallest amount of capital necessary, a typical contractor
is undercapitalized. In addition, contractors know little about running a shop,
even though they may have worked in one. Lack of business experience and
education, lack of capital, and fierce competition with other contractors all
contribute to the contractor's limited power to bargain with manufacturers.
B. Garment Workers and the Modem "Sweatshop"
Similarly, garment workers have limited power to bargain with their direct
employers, the contractors. A typical garment worker is a woman of color who
recently immigrated to the United States from Mexico, Latin America, or Asia,
who thus is less likely to assert her rights than the typical worker in another
industry. According to a congressional report, "[a]pparel is one of the largest
employers of women and minorities. People from small towns with few
alternatives, the under-educated, and immigrants are widely employed in the
industry, providing a low-wage, exploitable labor force. 3'
In many cases, garment workers immigrated to this country illegally. 2
According to census statistics, the garment industry depends more on undocu-
mented workers than any other industry.3 This reliance on undocumented
labor persists despite recent laws passed by Congress to prohibit such practic-
es. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), for example,
imposes fines against employers who hire undocumented workers. 4 Congress
passed this provision to reduce illegal immigration by driving illegal aliens out
of the workforce. 5 Theoretically, the industry should have faced dramatic
labor shortages after the passage of IRCA. Yet the October 1991 Garment and
Hospitality Industries Survey by the California Employment Development
Department indicated that, in the four areas where the garment industry is most
concentrated (Los Angeles, Orange County, San Diego, and the San Francisco
Bay area), only six out of 120 garment employers reported any labor shortage,
and none indicated that the shortage was related to IRCA.36
30. Weingarten, supra note 24, at 82, 86.
31. U.S. TEXTILE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 62.
32. According to one source, 39% of garment workers are undocumented aliens. Parsons, supra note
8, at 146.
33. Thompson, supra note 14, at 30; see also Weingarten, supra note 24, at 79 (quoting 60 Minutes
interview saying that if all undocumented workers were deported, U.S. garment industry would close down.
CBS television broadcast, Nov. 4, 1979).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (1988).
35. BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND U.S.
LABOR MARKETs: FIRST REPORT 3 (1991).
36. GARPMENT INDUSTRY SuRvEY, supra note 14, at 2.
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Immigrant rights advocates believe that IRCA merely exacerbated a bad
situation by driving garment workers underground.37 This has increased the
opportunity for contractors to force immigrants to accept lower wages and
substandard working conditions.38 As one commentator explained, "[i]t obvi-
ously hurts all workers when one sector of the labor force is driven further
underground. "39
Recent immigrants and undocumented workers generally are unfamiliar
with labor and health laws or standard labor practices in the United States.
4
0
Even when aware of these laws, they often are unwilling to assert their rights
for fear of deportation or job termination. Immigrants may view their situation
either as an inevitable condition of being employed or as outside the scope of
legal remedies.4' Indeed, complaining about pay or mandatory overtime is
often grounds for dismissal. Conversely, according to a recent article in the
San Francisco Examiner, workers often must give their employers gifts of
liquor and food to stay in favor.42 According to one immigrant garment
worker, "If your supervisor tells you to sit there, you sit there; if he tells you
to kneel, you kneel. "'
In another instance, a Los Angeles Herald Examiner reporter disguised
herself as a poor Brazilian without working papers and obtained work in
several garment shops in Los Angeles. She reported that the conditions in the
shops were "worse than I ever imagined in this country. If I hadn't been there,
I would not have believed it." She was "grossly and unfairly underpaid," a
meager $38.74 for five days of work in a non-union shop and $2.50 per hour
for seven hours of work in a union shop.'
The term "sweatshop" can be used to describe businesses exhibiting any
number of traits: shops that do not pay the Federal minimum wage or, in union
shops, the wage stipulated by the union contract; shops with poor lighting that
are overheated, often because boilers for the pressers are in the same room
as the sewing machines; shops that are in violation of building, safety, and
sanitation laws; and shops that require workers to take work home.45 In 1983,
37. Doug Turetsky, Immigrants Sweat It Out in Illegal Garment Factories, IN THESE TIMES, May
16, 1990, at 9. Up to 35% of garment production occurs in unregulated, "underground" shops. U.S.
TEXTILE SPEcIAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 62.
38. Thompson, supra note 14, at 84.
39. Turetsky, supra note 37, at 9.
40. Barbara E. Koh, Alterations Needed: A Study of the Disjunction Between the Legal Scheme and
Chinatown Garment Workers, 36 STAN. L. REv. 825, 833-34 (1984).
41. Id. at 844.
42. Steven A. Chin, Sweatshops: Bay's Ugly Secret, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 13, 1989, at A10.
43. Id.
44. Merle Linda Wolin, Sweatshop: Underneath in the Garment Industry (pt. 1), L.A. HERALD
EXAMINER, Jan. 14, 1981, at Al.
45. Merle Linda Wolin, Sweatshop: Underneath in the Garment Industry (pt. 2), L.A. HERALD
EXAMINER, Jan. 19, 1981, at A8. For a detailed discussion of sweatshop conditions and the reappearance
of sweatshops in New York and California, see Weingarten, supra note 24, at 71-78.
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New York Attorney General Robert Abrams stated that, "the sweatshop is
almost as big a problem as it was at the turn of the century .... "46 That
year a major New York Times report on wage and hour violations in New
York's Chinatown described working conditions as follows:
Workers can make $5 an hour, particularly in union shops, although wages can run
as low as $1 an hour or, for a time, as high as $9 an hour, because of the compli-
cated piecework wage system that has almost always existed in the industry. The
industry and the union consider this system efficient, and there is little effort to
change it, although some critics and some workers say it makes the workers both
slave driver and slave.
Wages in a Chinatown shop are 50 cents for a skirt and 50 cents for a jacket,
two workers said. For this, the workers said, they must, on a skirt, sew two darts,
a waistband and a zipper, and make a slit; on a jacket, they must sew a pocket and
do top stitching.
The workers, both of whom had been in the garment industry for several years,
said they were making about $9 or $10 a day [in a union shop]. They said their
employers altered the hours listed on their checks to make it appear as though they
received the minimum wage.47
The "piecework wage system" refers to an incentive system that divides
garment production into repetitive tasks requiring little skill. Instead of sewing
a whole garment, workers sew only collars, sleeves, zippers, or buttonholes
and are paid according to the number of "pieces" they complete. Many gar-
ment workers are paid on this basis. In reality, the piecework system, rather
than being a true incentive device, is used to circumvent the wage and hour
laws.48
As the preceding discussion indicates, many garment workers are not paid
minimum wage and do not receive overtime pay. This situation both demands
reform and seems ripe for unionization. However, "hostility from employers,
a high failure rate among businesses and the transient and vulnerable nature
of many employees have undermined organizing drives. "49 The ILGWU, for
example, has succeeded in attracting only thirty percent of women garment
workers to its ranks.50
46. William Serrin, After Years ofDecline, Sweatshops Are Back, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1983, at Al.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Bob Baker, Union Targets Sweatshops Operators, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at B3.
50. Gust & Newbergh, supra note 15, at A8. For a more detailed discussion of the union's role, see
Koh, supra note 40, at 829-31, 847 (discussing failure of ILGWU in San Francisco's Chinatown); Parsons,
supra note 8, at 132-33 (examining reasons for decline in unionization in garment industry); Weingarten,
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IV. MANUFACTURER COMPLICITY IN WAGER AND HOUR VIOLATIONS
Manufacturers generally deny responsibility for the pervasive wage and
hour violations in the garment industry. Despite the extent to which the
problem has been publicized and the special efforts that labor law enforcement
officials have directed to the garment industry, manufacturers maintain their
ignorance of widespread labor rights abuses. The following statement of an
industry official represents the manufacturers' general attitude: "[m]anufac-
turers have no control over any violations by the contractors .... There may
be some rogue contractors out there who violate the law, and they should be
flogged .... But the manufacturers can't be held responsible. "51
Garment workers, contractors, and observers of the industry such as
enforcement officials and union organizers argue that the very manufacturers
who deny their complicity have helped create the problem through their pricing
techniques. Generally, manufacturers calculate the contract price on the basis
of the time it takes their sample-makers 2 to produce the garment under
"accepted industry conditions."53 However, such estimates inaccurately reflect
the actual production process.
A valid time-and-motion study that purports to reflect the amount of work
to be done by a garment worker must be based on the performance of an
average laborer working under average conditions. Therefore, a realistic
contract price estimate must take several factors into account: the quality of
sewing specifications, supervision, tools, and equipment; the skill level of
garment workers; delays beyond the workers' control; the amount contractors
have to pay pieceworkers who cannot sew enough pieces of garment to earn
the minimum wage; and the time workers need to learn a new style.5 4 A
manufacturer's time-and-motion study, on the other hand, is based on the time
it takes sample-makers working under conditions far better than those in the
average sweatshop to produce a given garment. Contract prices based on these
studies therefore underestimate the amount of time necessary for the typical
garment worker to sew a piece of a garment using old machines and under
little or no supervision.
A great deal of evidence indicates that these techniques result in contract
prices so low that they leave contractors in only slightly better financial
position than their workers. Contractors frequently complain that manufacturers
do not pay them enough to cover costs and make a profit. In a recent article
51. Collier, supra note 1, at 12 (quoting Randall Harris, Executive Director of Fashion Industries,
clothing industry umbrella group).
52. Sample-makers are seamstresses generally hired to sew sample garments to be displayed in
showrooms for retailers' and buyers' inspection.
53. Wolin, supra note 44, at A10.
54. Merle Linda Wolin, Sweatshop: Underneath in the Garment Industry (pt. 4), L.A. HERALD
EXAMINER, Jan. 25, 1981, at A12.
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in the Los Angeles Times,, contractors in Southern California complained that
"they are paid so little by the manufacturers that they themselves are barely
earning the minimum wage."5' As one contractor stated, "[w ] hy doesn't the
Labor Department go to the shops and ask us how much 'we get for one
garment .... If they did that they would go [fine] the manufacturer because
they didn't pay us the minimum wage. '"56 Thus, after contractors complete
a job, they often have little money left to pay themselves. Naturally, even less
remains for the workers. Yet contractors continue to accept the prices set by
manufacturers, knowing that competitors will take the work they reject. As
anthropologist Bernard Wong noted, "[w]hoever enters the lowest bid gets it.
It's a dog-eat-dog world. "'
Unscrupulous manufacturers also abuse contractors by refusing to pay the
contract price because the apparel is purportedly either improperly sewn or
not delivered in time. In California, for example, within a two-year period
over three hundred contractors informally complained to the California Depart-
ment of Labor Standards Enforcement about manufacturer nonpayment for
completed work."8 The director of the Department's Concentrated Enforce-
ment Program estimated that in eighty percent of the cases, manufacturers did
not substantiate their arguments. They merely stated that they had to hire
another contractor to rectify the first contractor's errors and that the apparel
had already been shipped to the retailer. In a majority of these cases there are
no written contracts, making it difficult for contractors to win lawsuits, even
in the rare instance that they are able to retain attorneys. Nonpayment by the
manufacturer directly affects garment workers: when a manufacturer refuses
to pay the contract price, the contractor reduces the workers' wages or goes
out of business without paying them.
Cutting labor costs is critically important for garment contractors. Over-
head costs such as rent and utilities are fixed, and there is little room for
entrepreneurial spirit among contractors, who neither buy their own fabric nor
merchandise the final product. In essence, garment contractors are selling
labor, which constitutes most of the contract price. A tiny difference in labor
costs, especially on a large order, may make or break a contractor.
5 9
Cutting labor costs has become even more important in recent years, since
overhead costs have increased without corresponding increases in contract
55. Sonni Efron, Targets Get Bigger in Sweatshops War, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1990, at A3.
56. Quoted in id.
57. Newbergh & Gust, supra note 26, at A9.
58. Merle Linda Wolin, Sweatshop: Underneath in the Garment Industry (pt. 3), L.A. HERALD
EXAMINER, Jan. 22, 1981, at A10.
59. U.S. TExTiLE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 62; Weingarten, supra note 24, at 97; Harold
P. Dygert, 11 & David Shibata, Comment, Chinatown Sweatshops: Wage Law Violations in the Garment
Industry, 8 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 63, 64 n.10 (1975).
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prices." Ironically, fines incurred by contractors for labor and health code
violations add to the costs, increasing non-wage expenses and further decreas-
ing workers' salaries. One contractor admitted that small companies often
violate labor laws, explaining, "Small shops cannot afford to pay minimum
wage, or overtime. Profits are very small, and with costs, nobody can afford
minimum wage.""
V. CORRECTING ABUSES: AN AMENDMENT TO, FLSA
Employers are unlikely to improve working conditions in the garment
industry under the current legislative scheme. Therefore, Congress should
amend FLSA to hold manufacturers jointly liable with contractors for wage
and hour violations-. This initiative will ensure that the rights protected by
FLSA are supported by corresponding remedies.
A. The Ineffectiveness of Current Law
The Fair Labor Standards Act was designed to protect both the unorganized
and the lowest paid workers, those workers with little bargaining power to
protect themselves from exploitative wages and excessive hours.62 Today's
typical garment workers are exactly the type of workers Congress intended to
protect, "the men and women who are not organized ... who are subject to
the tyranny and oppression of sweatshops . . . ,,6" Clearly,. however, the
wage and hour laws and the enforcement mechanisms currently in place have
not achieved these goals.'
The Fair Labor Standards Act has failed to protect garment workers
primarily because it has not dealt with the underlying cause of the sweatshop
problem: the inability of workers and contractors to force the manufacturer's
capital to be dispersed equitably among the various levels of production.
Without manufacturer liability, abuses will not be rectified and the protective
and remedial goals of FLSA will go unfulfilled.
60. A shift in the industry toward using synthetic fabrics exacerbated this trend by lowering material
costs, thus accentuating the significance of labor cost differentials. Parsons, supra note 8, at 120.
61. Collier, supra note 1, at 12.
62. 81 CoNG. REC. 7652, 7672 (1937) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
63. Id. at 7652.
64. For further discussion of reasons that legislation has failed to protect garment workers, see
Weingarten, supra note 24, at 77, 99; see also Koh, supra note 40, at 842-54 (comparing ineffectiveness
of legal regime for labor rights with more effective scheme for housing law in San Francisco's Chinatown).
For a discussion of how FLSA has failed to meet the needs of homeworkers, see Laura Helene Goushorek,
Note, Crisis after Dole: The Plight of Modern Homeworkers, 8 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 167, 174-77, 188-89
(1990).
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The current system relies heavily on government enforcement mechanisms
that require resources the government is unable or unwilling to allocate.' 5 It
also presumes that garment workers will bring lawsuits. This presumption fails
to take into account the prohibitively expensive nature of such litigation, the
socio-cultural barriers to seeking legal remedies," and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the impracticability of collecting damages from most contractors, whose
limited assets make them judgment-proof.
Manufacturer liability goes to the heart of the sweatshop problem: the
contracting arrangement primarily used to evade the minimum wage laws.
Manufacturer liability would promote the pursuit of remedies. Garment
workers who have little incentive to sue an insolvent contractor are more likely
to initiate lawsuits to collect unpaid wages if a solvent defendant is available.
B. Liability Theories
Garment manufacturers who claim that they are not jointly liable for labor
law violations that occur in their contractors' shops base their argument on the
outdated notion that manufacturers should not be held liable for the acts of
their independent contractors. At common law, courts used a control test to
distinguish employees from independent contractors.' The distinction deter-
mined a master's liability for the wrongful acts of an alleged servant under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.6" Where the tort-feasor was an independent
contractor beyond the control of the master, the master could not be held
liable.
The rationale for this rule is often stated as follows: since the person hiring
the independent contractor (the "master") does not have the power to control
the contractor's manner of working, the master should be able to rely on the
presumption that the contractor will comply with any legal duties owed to
employees and third persons.6 9 The work is to be regarded as the contractor's
own business, and the contractor is the proper party responsible for preventing,
bearing, and distributing the risk.7' However, many exceptions to this rule
have developed in the last century, and the general rule is followed today only
65. Indeed, a bill introduced in 1989 by Representative Charles E. Schumer (D-New York), called
the Sweatshops Prevention Act of 1989, provided for penalties of $10,000 a year for repeat violators, and
allowed Federal authorities to seize garments. It also provided a criminal penalty of up to one year. But
the measure was aimed only at contractors, not at manufacturers. H.R. 3125, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. §§
4-5 (1989) (did not pass Education & Labor Committee).
66. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
67. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
68. See id. §§ 219-220.
69. See Harold A. Newman Co. v. Nero, 31 Cal. App. 3d 490, 496 (1973); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965).
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where "no good reason is found for departing from it."71 Policy consider-
ations frequently call for such a departure.7'
The claim that garment manufacturers cannot be held legally liable for the
acts of their "independent" contractors is faulty. Vicarious liability is anything
but a novel concept, except perhaps to garment manufacturers.73 Manufactur-
ers can indeed be held liable for contractors' violations of FLSA under a
theory of vicarious liability that accounts for risk allocation and receipt of
benefits. Such a theory is grounded in sound public policy. By vicariously
holding a master liable for his or her servant's tort, the law attempts to allocate
risk of loss to the person best able to anticipate, prevent, spread, or bear the
loss. 74
Under this theory, vicarious liability may attach to an actor if he or she
receives some type of benefit from the servant's actions. For example, an
employer could be held liable for certain acts of its independent contractor
based on the arguments that:
the enterprise is still the employer's, since he remains the person primarily to be
benefitted by it, that he selects the contractor, and is free to insist upon one who
is financially responsible, and to demand indemnity from him, and that the insurance
necessary to distribute the risk is properly a cost of his business.75
Garment manufacturers benefit in the form of lower contract prices from the
fierce competition among contractors and from violations of minimum wage
laws. They can help solve the problem by selecting contractors who pay the
minimum wage and who are financially responsible. Thus, sound public policy
reasons support precluding garment manufacturers from disclaiming responsi-
bility for sweatshop conditions solely because contractors are separate business
entities.
Manufacturer liability gains further support from FLSA's stated policy of
eliminating unfair competition between producers who pay the minimum wage
and producers who benefit from violating wage laws.76 Since wage and hour
71. Henderson Bros. Stores v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 910 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409-429 (1965) (listing exceptions to general rule, e.g.,
negligence of employer in selecting, instructing, or supervising contractor; non-delegable duties of employer
arising from relation to public or particular plaintiff; or inherently dangerous work). See generally Marc
H. Monheimer, Comment, Liability for the Torts of Independent Contractors in California, 44 CAL. L.
REV. 762 (1956) (explaining development and growth of exceptions to presumption of non-liability in
California courts).
73. See generally John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Act: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REV.
315 (1894) (tracing historical development of liability from Germanic law).
74. See GUiDo CALABRESI, TE COSTS OF ACCIDENTs21, 39 (1970); John B. Attansio, The Principle
of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Product Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677, 695,
700 (1988); William O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (pt. 1), 38 YALE L.J. 584
(1929).
75. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 509 (5th ed.
1984).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
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laws are not comprehensively enforced against contractors, some contractors
will always reduce their price by violating minimum wage laws; unless manu-
facturers are held liable, some manufacturers will always use those contractors.
This unfair competition will continue as long as the manufacturers, who
basically determine wages, escape liability for the violations they thereby
cause.
VI. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS: MANUFACTURER LOBBIES AND
"RUNAWAY SHOPS"
Congress should not rely on state legislatures to solve these problems, since
if only some states pass appropriate legislation, manufacturers will move to
states that do not impose liability. A federal approach avoids this problem most
efficiently. Such an approach would allow supporters of manufacturer liability
to concentrate their efforts at the federal level instead of spreading their limited
resources to fight difficult legislative battles in fifty separate state legislatures.
A. Conserving Resources
In states like California, New York, and Texas, where the garment industry
accounts for a substantial part of economic activity, the manufacturer lobbies
have consistently defeated attempts to pass manufacturer liability legislation.
A review of recent attempts in California to enact such legislation illustrates
the political difficulties facing labor advocates.
Since the Garment Manufacturing Act was passed in California in 1980,"
state lawmakers have attempted on several occasions to pass legislation that
expressly holds manufacturers liable for their contractors' labor violations.
Legislative reforms have been uniformly worded. For example, Assembly Bill
1542, introduced in 1991, is typical:
[Elvery person engaged in the business of garment manufacturing who contracts
to have garment manufacturing operations performed by another person as an
independent contractor shall be liable, with respect to these operations, to the same
extent as the independent contractor for any violation . . . committed by the
independent contractor, and shall be subject to the same penalties assessed against
the independent contractor .... 7
In 1990, the California state legislature had passed a similar bill. However,
the Garment Manufacturers Association vigorously opposed the measure.
Manufacturers argued that its passage would "cripple domestic manufactur-
ing. "I They claimed that the liability bill would force them to hire "a fleet
77. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2670-2674.2 (West 1989).
78. Cal. A.B. 1542, available in LEXIS, Legislature Library (LEGIS), California Bill Tracking File
(CATRCK).
79. Efron, supra note 55, at A3.
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of labor police," adding an expense that would prompt more manufacturers
to produce their garments in other states."0
In response to this opposition, Governor George Deukmejian vetoed the
bill. This veto was especially troubling since the Governor had already ap-
proved a major reduction in state enforcement capability. Prior to Governor
Deukmejian's election, the state Labor Department's Concentrated Enforcement
Program (CEP) had fifty-nine inspectors assigned to monitor the garment
industry. Upon assuming office, Governor Deukmejian abolished the entire
unit and annually decreased the overall size and budget of the Bureau of Field
Enforcement, the CEP's parent agency."'
Supporters of a manufacturer liability bill will clearly have a difficult battle
to fight in any forum. To conserve resources, therefore, it is best that they
begin at the federal level.
B. Refuting the Critics: Manufacturer Liability and Runaway Shops
Critics of manufacturer liability argue that, just as California legislation
might prompt manufacturers to move to New York, federal legislation will
prompt manufacturers to move overseas. Although this risk is a real concern,
it should not deter Congress from amending FLSA, for two reasons. First, the
factors that encouraged garment shops to return to the United States in recent
years82 will continue to exist. Although manufacturer liability might shift the
balance of competing forces somewhat, there is no evidence that it would tip
the scales. Second, to admit that the fear of runaway shops should govern U.S.
labor law is to. concede that the United States must adopt a lowest common
denominator approach to worker rights in order to remain competitive. Such
an approach is intolerable for a country that has achieved such a high level of
development. Indeed, it may well be an intolerable approach for any country,
regardless of the sophistication of its economy.
C. Assessment
Worker rights advocates would naturally prefer manufacturer liability to
take the form of strict liability, akin to the injunction provision of FLSA,
which allows the Department of Labor to obtain an injunction preventing
manufacturers from shipping goods produced in violation of labor laws.'
However, political reality may make such a scheme unattainable. Legislators
who remain concerned about runaway shops will probably block efforts to
80. ld.
81. More Heat on Sweatshops, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 23, 1990, at B8.
82. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 215, 217 (1988).
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impose strict liability. A more realistic alternative would be to amend FLSA
to impose liability on manufacturers who know or should have known that the
apparel was produced in violation of the minimum wage and overtime provi-
sions of FLSA.
In the light of California's experience, however, the prospect for passing
even this weaker legislation is not particularly encouraging. Since beneficiaries
of such legislation would be primarily poor immigrant women who generally
do not have the right to vote, members of Congress will probably perceive that
ignoring this issue would have few political repercussions. Pressure for
inclusion of such a measure as part of other legislation promoted by organized
labor, i.e., as a "rider" to future minimum wage legislation, should therefore
be given serious consideration.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress should amend FLSA to hold garment manufacturers strictly liable
for wage and hour violations occurring in the sweatshops. Such an amendment
is necessary to combat worker exploitation and manufacturers' complicity in
perpetuating the abominable conditions rampant in the industry. Until such a
stronger measure is enacted, enforcement of current law will be difficult, if
not impossible. As one California state enforcement official said, "We're just
putting our finger in the dike. It's a runaway industry. There's not much we
can do about it."I
84. Newbergh & Gust, supra note 15, at A9.
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